Abstract. Directed signature is the solution of such problems when the signed message contains information sensitive to the signature receiver. Generally, in many application of directed signature, the signer is generally a single person. But when the message is on behalf of an organization, a valid sensitive message may require the approval of several people. Threshold signature schemes are used to solve these problems. This paper presents a threshold directed signature scheme.
Introduction
Physical signature is a natural tool to authenticate the communication ,but it is useless in electronic messages; one has to rely on other methods like digital signature. Digital signature is a cryptographic tool to solve this problems of authenticity in electronic communications. Basically digital signature has a property that anyone having a copy of the signature can check its validity by using some public-information, but no one else can forge the signature on another document. This self-authentication property of digital signatures is quite suitable for many uses such as broadcasting of announcements and public key certificates, but it unsuitable for many applications.
In many situations, signed message is sensitive to the signature receiver. Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business transactions are such situations. For these situations the signature on the message should be such as only the signature receiver can verify the signature and can prove the validity of the signature to any third party , whenever necessary.. Such signatures are called directed signatures [3, 4, 13, 14] .In directed signature scheme, the signature receiver B has full control over the signature verification process. Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation.
In most situations, the signer is generally a single person. However when the message is on behalf of an organization, a valid message may require the approval or consent of several people. In this case, the signature is done by more than one consenting rather than by a single person. A common example of this policy is a large bank transaction, which requires the signature of more than one person. Such a policy could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this solution increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer.
Threshold signature is an answer to this problem.
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The (t, n) threshold signature schemes [6, 7, 8, 10, 12] are used to solve these problems. Threshold signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by Desmedt [7, 8] . In 1991 Desmedt and Frankel [6] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme based on the RSA assumption. This paper proposed a (t , n) threshold directed signature scheme based on Shamir's threshold signature scheme [21] and Schnorr's signature scheme [20] .
The section-2 presents some basic tools. In Section-3 we present a Threshold Directed Signature Scheme. Section-4 discusses the security of the Scheme. An illustration to the scheme is discussed in section-5. Remarks are in section-6.
Preliminaries
2.1. Throughout this paper we will use the following system setting.
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 < p < 2 512 .
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 < q < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p -1.
• A number g, where g k (p -1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1 k p -1 such that g >1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp * ).
• A collision free one-way hash function h [23] .
The parameters p, q, g and h are common to all users. We assume that every user A chooses a [21] . These basic tools are briefly described below.
2.2.Schnorr's signature scheme
In this scheme, the signature of A on message m are given by ( A r , A S ), where,
Here random A k ∈ Zq is private to A . The signature are verified by checking the equality
2.3.Shamir's threshold scheme
Shamir's (t, n) threshold secret sharing signature scheme is a scheme to distribute a secret key K into n users in such a way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t -1 or less users reveal nothing about the secret. Shamir's scheme is based on Lagrange interpolation in a field. To implement it, a polynomial f of degree t -1 is randomly chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K.
Each user i is given a public identity i u and a secret share f ( i u ). Now any t out of n shareholders can reconstruct the secret K = f (0), by pooling their shares and using
Here we assume for simplicity that the authorized subset of t users consists of shareholders i for i =1,2,3…t.
Directed signature scheme
Suppose that user A wants to generate a signature on message m so that only the receiver B can verify the signature and that B can prove the validity of signature to any third party C, whenever necessary. This scheme consists of the following steps. 
(b). Using a one-way hash function h, A computes
A r = h (Z B , W B , m), and then A S = 2 a K − A x . A r mod q.
2.4.3.Proof of validity by B to any third party C (a) B sends to {
If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the next steps.
(c) B in a zero knowledge fashion proves to C that log µ Z B = log g B y as follows.
• C chooses random u, v ∈ Zp computes w = µ u . g v mod p and sends w to B.
• B chooses random ∈ Zp computes = w. g α mod p and γ = B x mod p, and sends , γ to C.
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• C sends u, v to B, by which B can verify that w = µ u . g v mod p.
• B sends to C, by which she can verify that
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present a threshold directed signature scheme. Let G be a group of n designated users, out of which any t members can generate the signature on a message m for a user B.
The user B can verify the signature and that B can prove its validity to any third party C, whenever necessary. Nobody can check the validity of the signature without the help of B. We describe a construction of threshold directed signature scheme for this situation as follows.
We assume the existence of a trusted share distribution center (SDC) which determines the group secrets parameters and the secret shares v i ,i ∈ G. Let H be any subset of G, containing t members. We also assume the existence of a designated combiner DC who collects partial signatures from each user in the subgroup H. Every shareholder in the group has equal authority with regard to the group secret. The generation of the directed signature requires t out of n shareholders and interaction with DC. This scheme consists of the following steps. (c) SDC computes a secret shares v i for each member of the group G, as,
3.1.1.Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation
Here u i is the public value associated with user i in the group.
(d) SDC sends v i to each user in a secret manner.
3.1.2.Signature generation by any t users
If any t out of n members of the group agree to sign a message m for user B, they generate the signature using following steps. 
Signature verification by B (a). B computes µ = [ g S (
G y ) R W ] mod p and Z = µ B x mod p.
Proof of validity by B to any third party C
This part of the protocol runs as in section-2.4.3 and we omit it here.
Security discussions
we now discuss security aspect of the proposed scheme. The receiver B can easily identify that someone has forged the signature.
(g). Can t or more shareholders act in collusion to reconstruct the polynomial f (x) .?
According to the following equation,
, the secret polynomial f (x) can be reconstructed with the knowledge of any t secret
So if in an organization the shareholders are known to each other ,the temptation for t of them to collude could be irresistible. As a result, they would find the secret key of the company , which will be continued to be used. This attack does not weaken the security of our scheme in the sense that the number of users that have to collude in order to forge the signature is not smaller than the threshold value. However it is worth pointing out that t or more users can conspire to compute the system secrets. 7
Illustration
The following illustration support our scheme for practical implementation. We assume there are four users in the system. Out of four users A , C , E and F any two users , say, A and F can generate the directed signature on a message m for the user B with secret and public key pair B x = 6 , B y = 8 respectively. The following steps illustrate this scheme.
Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation
Let SDC choose p = 23, q = 11, g = 18 and f (x) =. 
3.3.2.Signature generation by any t users
If any two users A and F out of four users agree to sign a message m for user B, then the signature generation has the following steps. If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the next steps.
(b) Now B proves to C that log 3 16 = log 18 8 in a zero knowledge fashion by using the following confirmation protocol.
(i). C chooses at random u = 11,v = 13 and computes w = 2 and sends w to B.
(ii). B chooses at random = 17 and computes = 16 and = 4 and sends , to C.
(iii). C sends u, v to B, by which B can verify that w = 2.
(iv). B sends to C, by which she can verify that = 16 and = 4
Remarks
In this scheme, we have used the ElGamal public key cryptosystem to obtain the construction of threshold directed signature scheme. The security of this cryptosystem is based on the discrete log problem. Only t -1 shadows are not sufficient to obtain the group secret key and they will also get no information about the group secret key, until t individuals act in collusion.
In this scheme, there is a designated combiner DC who collects the partial signature of the signer.
We should note that there is no secret information associated with the DC. Every user can compute his modified share under mod q. If q is not prime, then the calculations of the exponents is performed mod (q), which is not a prime. This implies that Lagrange interpolation for calculating the modified Signature receiver also has to perform the confirmation protocol in a zero knowledge fashion to prove the validity of signature.
